Online content platforms concern about the freshness of their content updates to their end customers, and increasingly more platforms now invite and pay the crowd to share real-time information (e.g., news and sensor data) to help reduce their ages of information (AoI). How much crowdsensed data to sample and buy over time is a critical question for a platform's AoI management, requiring a good balance between its AoI and the incurred sampling cost. This question becomes more interesting by considering the stage after sampling, where two platforms coexist in sharing the content delivery network of limited bandwidth, and one platform's update may jam or preempt the other's under negative network externalities. When the two selfish platforms know each other's sampling costs, we formulate their interaction as a non-cooperative game and show both want to over-sample to reduce their own AoI, causing the price of anarchy (PoA) to be infinity. To remedy this huge efficiency loss, we propose a non-monetary trigger mechanism of punishment in a repeated game to enforce the platforms' cooperation to achieve the social optimum. We also study the more challenging incomplete information scenario that platform 1 knows more information about sampling cost than platform 2 by hiding its sampling cost information in the Bayesian game. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that even platform 1 may get hurt by knowing more information. We successfully redesign the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to negate platform 1's information advantage and ensure no cheating. As compared to the social optimum, extensive simulations show that the mechanisms can remedy the huge efficiency loss due to platform competition in different information scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
Today many customers do not want to lose any breaking news or useful information in smartphone even if in minute, and online platforms (such as social media outlets and navigation applications) want to keep their content updates fresh to attract a good number of customers for subscription and profit [9, 16] . The platforms' updated real-time information can be news, traffic conditions, shopping promotions, restaurant discovery, and air quality conditions.
Age of information (AoI) is a promising metric to characterize a platform's content update delay from an application layer point of view, and AoI measures the duration from the moment that the latest content was generated to the current reception time [12] .
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Numerous works were done to analyze the AoI for a single link [4, 11, 12, 17] . [13] extended the long-run AoI analysis to the case of multiple sources for a last-come-first-serve (LCFS) M/M/1 queue with preemption policy. [1] [2] [3] also analyzed the benefit of queues to store outdated packets and improved the average age by choosing sampling rate. [10] further studied the case of multiple customers and optimized the scheduling design for general content arrival patterns. [21] studied the AoI-related market for users to buy fresh data from sources.
The existing works on AoI focus on technological issues for controlling time avarage age under different policies and scenarios, and do not study the economics of AoI management at the platform level. From economics perspective, there are two critical issues to address. First, on the supply side, a platform needs to take care of the large sampling cost to support AoI. More and more platforms now invite and pay the crowd to share real-time information (e.g., news and sensor data) at large sampling rates [6] . For example, online platform CrowdSpark 1 follows this crowdsensing approach and creates a large pool of professional and citizen journalists who are paid to submit news, stories videos and even stream live. Another example is Waze platform 2 who asks millions of drivers to report location-based observations (e.g., about visibility, congestion, and "black-ice" segments) when travelling in different areas of the city. We wonder how much crowdsensed data a platform should buy over time, expecting a balance between its AoI performance and the incurred sampling cost. In this AoI supply aspect, there were few study and we only notice that [20] studied how a single platform dynamically prices and rewards sensors for controlling the AoI.
The other economic issue is on the delivery side, where more than one selfish platform shares the same content delivery network for managing individual AoI. Content delivery network is of limited bandwidth competed among separate content providers [14, 18] . One platform's content update can jam or preempt the other's update, reducing its own AoI at the cost of the other's. How to enforce their coordination despite the selfish nature of each is another question, requiring new mechanism design under negative network externalities. In the literature, there are some game theoretic studies on duopoly competition under externalities without mechanism design [5, 15] . [19] studied direct pricing or subsidy based mechanisms to seek duopoly cooperation, yet such direct payment is difficult to implement and realize by asking platforms to pay additionally on top of existing contracts to the Internet service provider (ISP). Regarding the literature on indirect (non-monetary) cooperation mechanism between two parties (of the same market power), there are some repeated game studies that proposed trigger mechanisms of long-term punishment to hinder any party's deviation from cooperation [7, 8] . Yet these mechanisms only work for complete information and sufficiently large discount factor when each party cares enough for its future return. Differently, we design new trigger-and-punishment mechanisms here to work for any discount factor and various information scenarios.
Our key novelty and main contributions are summarized as follows.
• Economic analysis of AoI management under network externalites: To our best knowledge, this is the first paper studying the economics issues of managing AoI, and we take into account the sampling costs on information supply side and the platforms' update competition on the information delivery side. We model the two selfish platforms' interactions in a non-cooperative game in the various information scenarios, depending on how well one platform knows about the other's sampling cost.
• Huge efficiency loss due to duopoly competition: Under complete information, each platform competes to increase its sampling rate without caring the other's AoI increase, and we prove the price of anarchy (PoA) is infinity. Under incomplete information where platform 1 can hide its sample cost realization from platform 2 in the Bayesian game, we show that platform 1 may get hurt from gaining more information and the PoA is also infinity.
• Trigger mechanism of punishment for achieving social optimum under complete information: To remedy the huge inefficiency loss under complete information, we design a nonmonetary trigger mechanism of punishment in repeated games to enforce the two platforms to cooperate, where we update the platforms' cooperation profile for fitting any discount factor. As the discount factor increases, the mechanism's achieved performance improves to achieve social optimum as platforms are more forward-looking to cooperate. We show that platforms may or may not benefit from low sampling costs and large network bandwidth.
• Approximate trigger-and-punishment mechanism design under incomplete information: To reduce the efficiency loss between the Bayesian competition equilibrium and the social optimum under incomplete information, we propose an approximate mechanism in repeated games to enforce platforms' cooperation. Note that our prior mechanism under complete information does not work here, as platform 1 now with information advantage can strategically deviate to under-or over-sample without being caught. We successfully redesign the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to negate platform 1's information advantage and ensure no cheating. Extensive simulations show that the mechanisms can remedy the huge efficiency loss due to platform competition in different information scenarios.
SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
As shown in Fig. 1 , two online platforms Crowdspark and Waze first sample new content (e.g., reports of spotted news and traffic conditions) from their crowdsensing pools at Poisson rates λ 1 and Figure 1 : Illustration of System Model. Two platforms Crowdspark and Waze respectively buy samples from their crowdsensing pools at Poisson rates λ 1 and λ 2 , and then update to their end customers through the delivery network of bandwidth µ. λ 2 , respectively, and then share the ISP's content delivery network of limited bandwidth µ to update new content to their customers in the same area. Here λ i denotes the rate of sampling generation of new information for platform i. Similar to [13] , we assume in each platform's crowdsensing pool, the sampling from each sensor over time follows a Poisson process, and the total sampling to platform i ∈ {1, 2} as superposition also follows Poisson process with mean rate λ i . Platform i can control mean rate λ i by providing proper incentive compensation to the crowdsensing pool as in [6] , and its average sampling cost is c i λ i with unit compensation cost c i . After sampling, we assume the content transmission time through the delivery network follows an exponential distribution with rate µ. Without much loss of generality, we assume that the network applies a LCFS M/M/1 queue with preemption policy for processing the two platforms' updates as in [13] , where the latest content arrival can preempt any platform's ongoing update in service. 3 According to [13] , the time-average AoI at platform i is given by
which decreases with its own sampling rate λ i and network bandwidth µ, and increases with the other platform's sampling rate λ −i under negative network externalities. By further taking sampling cost into consideration, we define platform i's total cost function as
requiring platform i to balance the AoI and the sampling cost when deciding its λ i . Unlike each platform who only aims to minimize its own cost objective, the social planner wants to minimize the social cost as defined below:
In practice, a platform knows its own sampling cost yet may or may not know the other platform's cost exactly, next we present our preliminary results for two platforms' equilibrium interactions under both complete and incomplete information.
Competition Equilibrium under Complete Information
We first consider the information scenario that each cost c i is known to both platforms. Without loss of generality, we assume c 1 ≤ c 2 .
We formulate the two platforms' interaction in the non-cooperative static game where platform i decides its own λ i to minimize its total cost π i (λ i , λ −i ) in (1) without caring for the other's AoI. As outcome of this game, we denote (λ * 1 , λ * 2 ) as the equilibrium sampling rates. To tell the maximum efficiency loss due to their selfish competition, we use the concept of price of anarchy (PoA) below:
, where (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ) tell the social optimizers when both platforms cooperate to minimize the social cost. By checking the first-order conditions of convex social costs π 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) and π 2 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) with respect to λ 1 and λ 2 , we have the following result. Proposition 2.1. Under complete information, the social optimizer (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ), are the unique solutions to
Differently, the competition equilibrium (λ * 1 , λ * 2 ) are the unique solutions to
By comparing (2) and (3), we conclude competition leads over-sampling (λ * i ≥ λ * * i for i = 1, 2) at the equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2.1 is given in Appendix A. We notice in (2) that at social optimum platform 1 cares about its sampling's negative externality effect 1 λ 2 µ on platform 2 and will sample conservatively, while this is missing in (3) due to selfishness. The following result also explains their competition to over-sample at the equilibrium. Intuitively, each platform worries that its update is preempted by the other platform, and will sample and update more. Such competitive interaction causes huge efficiency loss, as shown below. Proposition 2.3. Price of anarchy under complete information is PoA = ∞, which is achieved when platform 1's sampling cost c 1 is infinitesimal as compared to c 2 .
Proof. When c 1 → 0 and c 2 > 0, platform 1 does not care its sampling cost and only aims to minimize its AoI. According to (3), we can show that λ * 1 will go to infinity and this stimulates platform 2's λ * 2 to reach infinity. However, at social optimum (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ) in (2) and the resultant social cost π (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ) are finite. Then we have
□
This huge efficiency loss motivates us to design cooperation mechanisms to mitigate the competition between the two platforms. This is easily realized if the social planner (e.g., the ISP) can charge 1 λ * * −i µ per sampling rate λ i from platform i. However, this additional charging is intrusive and difficult to implement in practice, given the content platforms' existing flat-fee contracts with ISP. This motivates us to design non-monetary cooperation mechanisms in repeated games in Section 3.
Competition Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Now we consider the incomplete or asymmetric information scenario that platform 1 has probability p H of having high sampling cost c H and probability 1 − p H of having low sampling cost c L each time it samples, while platform 2's sampling cost c 2 is constant over time. On one hand, platform 1 knows both its c 1 realization (c L or c H ) and c 2 . On the other hand, platform 2 knows its own cost c 2 and the probability distribution of c 1 . It is aware of platform 1's information advantage, and we wonder if platform 1 benefits from this and if we have similar efficiency loss result as complete information. 4 Without loss of generality, we assume platform 1's average cost is smaller, i.e.,
Since platform 1 knows its own unit cost exactly, it will take this information advantage and adaptively decide λ 1 (c H ) when c 1 = c H and λ 1 (c L ) when c 1 = c L . Unaware of particular c 1 realizations, platform 2 behaves indifferently to decide a uniform λ 2 . We model such platform interaction as a Bayesian game as follows. Given c 1 = c H , platform 1's cost function is
and otherwise,
Under incomplete information, platform 2's cost function is defined below in average sense:
The average social cost function is
Similar to the complete information scenario, we present the concept of PoA below in this incomplete information scenario:
,
summarize the social optimizers. By checking the first-order conditions of convex social costs
, λ 2 ) with respect to λ 1 and λ 2 , we have the following result.
are the unique solutions to
Differently, the competition equilibrium
Both platforms will over-sample at equilibrium, i.e., λ
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B. Similar to the complete information scenario, both platforms unnecessarily over-sample at competition equilibrium. Such competitive interaction also causes huge efficiency loss, as shown below. Proposition 2.5. Price of anarchy under incomplete information is PoA= ∞, which is achieved when platform 1's smaller sampling cost c L is infinitesimal as compared to c H or c 2 .
, λ * * 2 are still finite according to (8) (9) (10) . Then we have
□ If the social planner or ISP can charge 1 λ * * 2 µ per update from platform 1, and
from platform 2, then social optimum can be achieved. However, this is difficult to implement given the ISP's existing flat-fee contracts with the two platforms. We will design non-monetary cooperation mechanisms later in Section 4.
Finally, we check platform 1's equilibrium cost objective and wonder if it always takes advantage from knowing more information about the sampling costs of both platforms. Proposition 2.6. Under incomplete information, the total cost of platform 1 under each c 1 = c H realization is greater than that under complete information, and becomes smaller under each c 1 = c L realization. Perhaps surprisingly, its average cost
where (λ 2 (c H ),λ 2 (c L )) are sampling equilibria of platform 2 when knowing c 1 = c H and c 1 = c L under complete information, respectively. They are presented in Appendix C.
The proof is given in Appendix C. Under complete information, when c 1 = c H platform 1 does not want to sample much to save its sampling cost, and platform 2 knowing c 1 = c H estimates limited negative network externality from platform 1 and also samples conservatively. However, under incomplete information, platformthe two platforms' myopic decision-making to be more forwardlooking in the long run. In this repeated game, both platforms will simultaneously play the non-cooperative static game in Section 2.1 for infinitely many rounds with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Yet this repeated game alone is not enough to ensure cooperation, as each platform will behave the same as (λ * 1 , λ * 2 ) in (3) in each round. We next propose a trigger mechanism of punishment as potential threat to prevent their myopic behavior in the first place. Note that a platform's age of information decreases with its update and increases with the other platform's update under negative network externalities.
Definition 3.1. Non-forgiving trigger mechanism of punishment under complete information works in the following:
• In each round, each platform follows cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ), λ 2 (δ )) if neither was detected to deviate from this profile in the past. 5 • Once a deviation was found in the past, the two platforms will keep playing the equilibrium punishment profile
We expect the social planner (e.g., the ISP) to implement the cooperation mechanisms and recommend the cooperation or punishment profile to platforms based on their operations over time. One can imagine that as long as a platform cares enough for future costs under a large discount factor δ , it is unlikely to deviate to trigger severe punishment. It should be noted that in the extreme case of δ → 0, each platform only cares for immediate cost and (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) degenerate to (λ * 1 , λ * 2 ) in the one-shot game. We next design the cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) according to δ .
Cooperation Profile Design for Large δ
In the complete information scenario, suppose social optimum is attainable in the repeated games with (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) = (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ), then any deviation will bring in larger long-term costs for both platforms. We can use this no-deviation condition to reverse-engineer the feasible regime of large δ for enabling such (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ). If platform 1 chooses to deviate to λ 1 , it is optimal for it to deviate in the first round to enjoy the immediate benefit π 1 (λ 1 , λ * * 2 ) in (1) without any discount. Its optimal deviation or best response
according to (3) . Its (discounted) long-term cost over all time stages iŝ
where punishment is triggered since time stage 2. Otherwise, he will always cooperate and obtain the following cost without any deviation,
To ensure that platform 1 never deviates in repeated games, we requireΠ 1 ≥ Π 1 , or simply
Similarly, we require δ to be greater than the following threshold for platform 2:
Without loss of generality, we assume c 1 ≤ c 2 and platform 1 is more likely to deviate, with expecting δ th 1 ≥ δ th 2 . The following summarizes the trigger mechanism with updated cooperation profile for δ ≥ max(δ th 1 , δ th 2 ) = δ th 1 .
Proposition 3.2 (Large δ Regime). Under complete information, if δ ≥ δ th 1 in (17), both platforms will follow the perfect cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) = (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ) all the time without triggering the severe punishment profile (λ * 1 , λ * 2 ) in (3).
The thresholds δ th 1 and δ th 2 tell the platforms' willingness to cooperate and we prefer small thresholds. Given c 1 = c 2 , we manage to analytically examine the relationship between the common threshold δ th 1 = δ th 2 and other parameters. The proof is given in Appendix D. Intuitively, if µ is small, the two platforms compete severely for the network bandwidth and the increase of µ helps mitigate such competition. Thus, δ th 1 first decreases with µ. If µ is large, however, the increase of µ induces each platform to occupy the ample resource by updating more frequently for small AoI. Thus, δ th 1 then increases with µ.
If the sampling cost c 1 is small, platforms over-sample and this is equivalent to small µ, and we have similar result for the relationship between δ th 1 and c 1 . Even if c 1 c 2 and the analysis is involved, we can still gain similar relationships through simulations at the end of this section.
Cooperation Profile Design for Medium δ
If δ t h 2 ≤ δ < δ t h 1 , platform 2 will still follow social optimizer λ * * 2 yet platform 1 will deviate, requiring us to design a newλ 1 (δ ) instead of λ * * 1 for platform 1. Ensuring the long-term cost Π 1 (λ 1 (δ ), λ * * 2 ) in (16) without deviation just equal to (15) with deviation, we find the optimal feasibleδ 1 (δ ) by solving the following equation
which has the same structure as (17) . After some calculation, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.4 (Medium δ Regime). In the repeated game under complete information, if δ t h 2 ≤ δ < δ t h 1 , both platforms will always follow the cooperation profile below without deviating to trigger punishment (λ * 1 , λ * 2 ) in (3):
Here, λ * * 1 <λ 1 (δ ) < λ * 1 , whereλ 1 (δ ) decreases with δ ∈ [δ th 2 , δ th 1 ) and eventuallyλ 1 (δ ) → λ * * 1 .
The proof is given in Appendix E. As we prefer both platforms not to jam the network, a larger δ in the medium regime helps regulate platform 1's over-sampling.
Cooperation Profile Design for Small δ
If δ < δ t h 2 , neither platforms will follow the social optimizers, and we need to design new (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) jointly. Similar to (19) for one platform, we now have
for platform 1 and
for platform 2 for solving the optimal cooperation profile. Through further analysis, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.5 (Small δ Regime). In the repeated game under complete information, if δ < δ t h 2 , the two platforms will always Cooperation Profile for 2 platforms Figure 2 : Cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) of the trigger mechanism versus the discount factor δ , as compared to social optimizers (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 )
follow the optimal cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) below as unique solutions tõ
where λ * * 1 <λ 1 (δ ) ≤ λ * 1 and λ * * 2 <λ 2 (δ ) ≤ λ * 2 . As δ → 0, the proposed (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) approach (λ * 1 , λ * 2 ), and the repeated game degenerates to one-shot static game. As δ increases in the low regime [0, δ th 2 ), bothλ 1 (δ ) andλ 2 (δ ) decrease and the duopoly competition mitigates.
The proof is lengthy and can be found in Appendix F. Figure  2 shows how cooperation profile under our trigger mechanism of punishment changes with discount factor δ in all the three δ regimes. In small δ regime, both (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) decrease with δ until δ th 2 = 0.3 withλ 2 (δ ) = λ * * 2 . In medium δ regime, onlyλ 1 (δ ) decreases with δ until δ th 1 = 0.7. Finally, in large delta regime, the profile always equals (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ). The results are consistent with Propositions 3.4 and 3.5.
Under our optimized trigger mechanism of punishment in Propositions 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 above, one may wonder how the efficiency loss due to duopoly competition changes with discount factor δ in all the three δ regimes. Given the symmetric cost setting (c 1 = c 2 ), we manage to analytically derive the following result. Proposition 3.6. Given c 1 = c 2 under complete information, the ratio between social costs under the trigger mechanism of punishment and the social optimum decreases with δ until δ = δ th and keeps constant 1 since then. Figure 3 : Ratio between the social costs under our triggerand-punishment mechanism and the social optimum under complete information. We fix c 1 = 1, c 2 = 1.5 and change the ratio with µ and δ .
Proof. As platforms perform the same in each round of the repeated game under our mechanism and the social optimum, it is enough to examine the social cost ratio in one shot. Recall that under social optimum,
according to (3) and c 1 = c 2 , the corresponding social cost is
which is independent of δ . Under our optimal trigger mechanism, λ 1 (δ ) =λ 2 (δ ) with δ until δ = δ t h and keeps constant 1 since then, and the corresponding social cost is
Due to δ t h 1 = δ t h 2 , we only have low and high δ regimes without the medium one. In the regime of
always holds according to (23-24). By taking the first-oder derivative of π * in (25) onλ 1 (δ ), we have
. According to Proposition 3.5,λ 1 (δ ) decreases with δ for δ < δ t h 1 , thus π * decreases with δ for δ < δ t h 1 . Since π * * is a constant with δ , we have the ratio π * /π * * decreases with δ < δ t h 1 and keeps 1 with δ ≥ δ t h 1 . □ Given c 1 c 2 in general in Fig. 3 , as µ increases, δ th first decreases and then increases, which is consistent with Corollary 3.3 for symmetric cost case. Similarly, given c 1 , we can show that δ th first decreases and then increases with c 2 in Fig. 4 . Figure 4 : Ratio between the social costs under our triggerand-punishment mechanism and the social optimum under complete information. We fix c 1 = 1, µ = 1 and change the ratio with c 2 and δ .
APPROXIMATE TRIGGER-AND-PUNISHMENT MECHANISM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
To remedy the huge inefficiency with PoA= ∞ in Proposition 2.5, we want to stimulate cooperation between the two platforms to approach social optimum as much as possible under incomplete information. As introduced in Section 2.2, platform 1's sampling cost realization in each instance is unknown to platform 2. Similar to the complete information in Section 3, we propose to use an infinitely repeated games, where both platforms will simultaneously play the Bayesian game for infinitely many rounds with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Without any trigger mechanism of punishment, each platform will behave the same as ((λ * 1 (c H ), λ * 1 (c L )), λ * 2 ) in (11-13) in each round. However, we cannot similarly revise our non-forgiving trigger mechanism under complete information in Definition 3.1, by using the social optimal cooperation profile ((λ 1 (c H , δ ),λ 1 (c L , δ )),λ 2 (δ )). The reason is that under incomplete information, we cannot tell in each round whether platform 1's cost c 1 is c H or c L and platform 1 can chooseλ 1 (c L ) when c 1 = c H without triggering any punishment. Even if δ is large enough, the following lemma shows that platform 1 may not comply with ideal (λ * * 1 (c L ), λ * * 1 (c H )). Lemma 4.1. Given the cooperation profile (λ * * 1 (c L ), λ * * 1 (c H )) for platform 1 under sufficiently large δ , platform 1 will not deviate from
The proof is given in Appendix G. Once choosing between λ * * 1 (c L ) and λ * * 1 (c H ) in each round of the repeated game, platform 1 will not trigger any punishment. When c 1 = c L , platform 1 does not want to under-sample with low rate λ * * 1 (c H ) and high AoI; when c 1 = c H , platform 2 under-samples with λ * * 2 by considering platform 1's average cost under incomplete information, and platform 1 can take the information advantage to sample at high rate λ * * 1 (c L ) by using low AoI to justify its high sample cost.
To negate platform 1's information advantage under incomplete information, we next propose to blindly use platform 1's (deterministic) average cost to design its cooperation profile. In other words, we recommend an approximate termλ 1 (δ ) to platform 1 all the time, without alternating between precise termsλ 1 (c L , δ ) and λ 1 (c H , δ ) over time.
Definition 4.2. Approximate trigger mechanism of punishment under incomplete information is as follows:
• In each round, two platforms follow approximate cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) if neither was detected to deviate from this profile in the past.
• Once a deviation was found in the past, the two platforms will keep playing the equilibrium punishment profile ((λ * 1 (c H ), λ * 1 (c L )), λ * 2 ) in (11-13) forever. One can imagine that even if δ is sufficiently large, this approximate cooperation profile is still different from social optimal ((λ * * 1 (c H ), λ * * 1 (c L )), λ * * 2 ) and there is inevitably some efficiency loss to avoid platform 1's cheating using information advantage. We next design the cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) according to δ and examine the involved inefficiency gap.
Approximate Cooperation Profile Design for Large δ
Under incomplete information, platform 1 will behave indifferently no matter c 1 = c H or c 1 = c L in the repeated game. Then we can revise social optimum in (8-10) by treating platform 1's cost constant asĉ 1 :
Then we approximate the social optimum as unique solutions:
By comparing (26)-(27) with (8-10), we have the following result.
Lemma 4.3. Using approximation to smooth out platform 1's sampling variation, the two platforms will under-sample as compared to social optimum. That is,
Given (λ 1 ,λ 2 ) are attainable and any deviation from them will bring in larger long-term costs for both platforms, we can use this no-deviation condition to reverse-engineer the feasible regime of large δ for enabling (λ 1 ,λ 2 ) in the first place.
When c 1 = c L , if platform 1 chooses to deviate in the first round to enjoy the immediate benefit π 1 (λ 1 ,λ 2 ) in (1), its optimal deviation or best response to λ 2 =λ 2 in (27) is λ 1 = 1+λ 2 /µ c L according to (3) . Its (discounted) long-term cost over all time stages iŝ
Otherwise, it will obtain the following cost without any deviation,
To ensure that platform 1 never deviates when c 1 = c L in the repeated games, we requireΠ 1 (c
Similarly, we require the following to ensure no deviation when c 1 = c H :
Given platform 1 always choosesλ 1 , we require the following for platform 2 to followλ 2 :
Without loss of generality, we assume p H c H + (1 − p H )c L ≤ c 2 and platform 1 is more likely to deviate when c 1 = c L , that is,
. Under this assumption, note thatδ th 1 (c H ) may or may not be larger thanδ th 2 , depending on other parameters. The following summarizes the trigger mechanism with updated cooperation profile for δ ≥ max{δ th 1 (c L ),δ th 1 (c H ), δ th 2 } =δ th 1 (c L ).
Proposition 4.4 (Large δ Regime).
Under incomplete information, if δ ≥δ th 1 (c L ), both platforms will follow the approximated cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) = (λ 1 ,λ 2 ) all the time without triggering the severe punishment profile (11) (12) (13) .
If the two platforms have the same average costs, i.e., p H c H + (1 − p H )c L = c 2 , we use extensive simulation to show that the new mechanism can achieve a ratio 2. We will show simulations for more general case other than the symmetric cost case of p H c H + (1 − p H )c L = c 2 later on that the approximation gap is small.
Approximate Cooperation Profile Design
for Medium δ
, platform 2 will still follow perfect profileλ 2 in (27) yet platform 1 facing c L will deviate, requiring us to design a newλ 1 (δ ) instead ofλ 1 in (26) for platform 1. Similar to (30) and (31), we just need to ensure the long-term cost does not decrease after immediate deviation no matter whether c 1 = c L or c 1 = c H . At the optimality, equality holds and we have
By solving the equation above, we have the following cooperationλ 1 (δ ) for platform 1.
Proposition 4.5 (Medium δ Regime). In the repeated game under incomplete information, ifδ t h 2 ≤ δ <δ t h 1 (c L ), both platforms will always follow the cooperation profile below without deviating to trigger punishment (11-13):
where
The proof is in Appendix H.
Approximate Cooperation Profile Design for Small δ
If δ <δ t h 2 , neither platforms will follow cooperation profile (λ 1 ,λ 2 ) in (26)-(27), we need to design new (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) jointly. It should be noted that we do not care δ less or greater thanδ t h 1 (c H ) when c 1 = c H in this regime, as platform 1 will still deviate when c 1 = c L . Similar to (33), we have the following for platform 1:
and similar to (32) we have the following for platform 2:
By jointly solving the two equations above, we have the following cooperation (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) for the two platforms. follow the cooperation profile (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) as unique solutions tõ
The proof is in Appendix I. Figure 5 shows how approximate cooperation profile under our trigger mechanism of punishment changes with discount factor δ in all the three δ regimes. Here the mean costĉ 1 of platform 1 is less than that of platform 2 witĥ δ th 1 (c H ) <δ th 2 <δ th 1 (c L ). In small δ regime, both (λ 1 (δ ),λ 2 (δ )) decrease with δ untilδ th 2 = 0.3 withλ 2 (δ ) =λ 2 . In medium δ regime, onlyλ 1 (δ ) decreases with δ tillδ th 1 (c L ) = 0.7. Finally, in large delta regime, the profile eventually equals (λ 1 ,λ 2 ). Asĉ 1 = 19 and is close to c 2 = 20 here, the final profileλ 1 is close toλ 2 . Figures 6 and 7 show that the social cost ratio under our approximate trigger mechanism and the social optimum is decreasing in δ . The efficiency loss is mild especially for large δ . As µ increases, thresholdδ th first decreases and then increases, which is consistent with Figure 3 under complete information. Similarly, given c 1 , Fig.  7 show thatδ th first decreases and then increases with c 2 , which is similar to Fig. 4 . 
CONCLUSION
In this paper we study competition between online content platforms on AoI and the sampling cost, which concern the freshness of their updates on real-time information and sampling costs and compete for limited bandwidth in the content delivery network. When both platforms know each other's sampling costs, we formulate a non-cooperative static game under complete information, in which the two platforms over-sample to keep the freshness of their updates and cause huge efficiency loss. To remedy the loss, we propose a non-monetary trigger mechanism of punishment in a repeated game to achieve social optimum by enforcing two platforms' cooperation. The more challenging case is platform 1 has more information than platform 2 with hiding its sampling costs in the Bayesian game. However, platform 1 may get hurt by knowing more information than platform 2. To remedy huge inefficiency loss, we then redesign the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to approach social optimum with no cheating from platform 1.Extensive simulations show that the mechanisms can remedy the huge efficiency loss due to platform competition in different information scenarios. Our work can be extended to include multiple platforms. Under complete information, we just have more than two δ thresholds with one for each platform and there are more than three δ regimes to discuss. Besides, we can also enrich the incomplete information scenario and consider that platform 1 may not know platform 2's sampling cost realization, either. Then we can similarly extend our trigger-and-punishment mechanism as in Section 4.
A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1 A.1 Proof of Uniqueness of Social Optimizers
Let's first prove (2) has unique solutions and rewrite it as
To show λ 1 (λ 2 ) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 , we take the first-order and second-order derivatives of λ 1 (λ 2 ) as
is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 . Similarly we can show that λ 2 (λ 1 ) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 1 . By substituting λ 1 (λ 2 ) in (40) into λ 2 (λ 1 ) in (41), we simplify (40) and (41) as the following equation:
Since (42) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 1 (λ 2 ) and λ 1 (λ 2 ) in (42) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 , we obtain
is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 . To show (42) has only one positive solution, denote д(
where we know д(λ 2 ) is convex in λ 2 because of concavity of
. Therefore we know д ′ (λ 2 ) increases with λ 2 . Since
there exists unique a > 0 satisfying д ′ (a) = 0, then д(λ 2 ) decreases in (0, a] and increases in (a, ∞). Since д(0) = 0 and д(∞) → ∞, there exists unique λ * * 2 > 0 satisfying д(λ * * 2 ) = 0, thus (42) has unique positive solution. We plot д(λ 2 ) in Figure 8 . Similarly (40) has unique positive solution λ * * 1 . The social optimizers in (2) are unique. 
A.2 Proof of Uniqueness of Competition Equilibrium
Then let's prove uniqueness of (3) and rewrite it as
which are equivalent to the following equation:
. To show f (λ 1 ) only has one positive root, we check the first-order and second-order derivatives of f (λ 1 ) as
Since f ′′ (λ 1 ) < 0, f ′ (λ 1 ) decreases with λ 1 . Additionally, since f ′ (0) > 0 and f ′ (∞) < 0, then f ′ (λ 1 ) has exactly one positive root, denoted as f ′ (b) = 0. Then f (λ 1 ) is increasing in (0, b] and decreasing in (b, ∞). Also since
then f (λ 1 ) has unique positive root λ * 1 satisfying (45). We plot f (λ 1 ) in Figure 9 . Therefore λ * 2 is unique according to (44) and (3) has unique solutions.
Since λ 1 (λ 2 ) in (40) has an additional item 1 λ 2 µ in the denominator than λ 1 (λ 2 ) in (43), and λ 2 (λ 1 ) in (41) has an additional item 1 λ 1 µ in the denominator than λ 2 (λ 1 ) in (44), thus solutions to (40) and (41), (λ * * 1 , λ * * 2 ), are smaller than solutions to (43) and (44),
B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4 B.1 Proof of Uniqueness of Social Optimizers
Let's prove (8)- (10) have unique solutions first, which are equivalent to
Similar to (40) in Appendix A, here λ 1 (c H )(λ 2 ) in (46) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 , and λ 1 (c L )(λ 2 ) in (47) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 . Also similar to (41) in Appendix A, here
) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 1 (c H ) and λ 1 (c L ), respectively. By substituting λ 1 (c H )(λ 2 ) in (46) and (48), we simplify (46)-(48) as the following equation:
Since
in (49) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 1 (c H )(λ 2 ) and λ 1 (c L )(λ 2 ), respectively, and λ 1 (c H )(λ 2 ) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 , and λ 1 (c L )(λ 2 ) is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 , we then obtain
is concave and strictly increasing in λ 2 . To show (49) has only one positive solution, denote д(
there exists unique a > 0 satisfying д ′ (a) = 0, then д(λ 2 ) decreases in (0, a] and increases in (a, ∞). Since д(0) = 0 and д(∞) → ∞, there exists unique λ * * 2 > 0 satisfying д(λ * * 2 ) = 0, thus (49) has unique positive solution. Here we can plot д(λ 2 ) similarly to the curve in Figure 8 . Similarly (46) has unique positive solution λ * * 1 (c H ) and (47) has unique positive solution λ * * 1 (c L ). The social optimizers in (8)- (10) are unique.
B.2 Proof of Uniqueness of Competition Equilibrium
Then we prove (11)- (13) have unique solutions and rewrite them as
By comparing (50) and (51) we know
. Thus (50)-(52) can be rewritten as
(53)-(54) are equivalent to the following equation:
Denote
To show f (λ 1 (c H )) only has one positive root, we check the firstorder and second-order derivatives of f (λ 1 (c H )) as c H ) ) has unique positive root λ * 1 (c H ) satisfying (53)-(54). We can plot f (λ 1 (c H )) similarly to the curve in Figure 9 . Therefore λ * 2 is unique according to (54) and λ * 1 (c L ) is unique according to (55). Then (11)-(13) have unique solutions.
in the denominator than λ 2 (λ 1 ) in (52), thus solutions to (46)-(48), ((λ * * 1 (c H ), λ * * 1 (c L )), λ * * 2 ), are smaller than solutions to (50)-(52),
C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.6
If platform 2 has complete information on platform 1's sampling costs, they will play a static game with complete information as in (1), we then give the unique Nash Equilibrium ((
In the following, we first prove platform 1 hurts from knowing more information than platform 2 when c 1 = c H and it benefits when c 1 = c L , then prove platform 1 can get hurts.
We first show
. By comparing (53)- (54) and (58)
, the corresponding optimal λ 1 to minimize platform 1's cost isλ 1 
Then we obtain the result.
C.2 Proof of π
. When λ 2 = λ * 2 , the corresponding optimal λ 1 to minimize platform 1's cost is λ * 1 (c L ). By comparing (55)-(56) and (60)-(61), since
is smaller than 1, we have λ * 1 (c L ) ≤λ 1 (c L ), then π 1 (λ * 1 (c L ), λ * 2 ) ≤ π 1 (λ 1 (c L ), λ * 2 ). Next we'll show π 1 (λ 1 (c L ), λ * 2 ) ≤ π 1 (λ 1 (c L ),λ 2 (c L )). Since λ * 2 < λ 2 (c L ) and π 1 (λ 1 , λ 2 ) is increasing in λ 2 , we have π 1 (λ 1 (c L ), λ * 2 ) ≤ π 1 (λ 1 (c L ),λ 2 (c L )). Then we obtain the result.
C.3 Proof of Platform 1 Gets Hurt
Expected cost of platform 1 under platform 2's complete information is
Expected cost of platform 1 under platform 2's incomplete information is
If platform 1 gets hurt with platform 2's incomplete information, we have
which can be simplified as
With C.1 and C.2, we know the right-handed side of (62) is less than 1. (62) is equivalent to
which is the same as (14) .
D PROOF FOR COROLLARY 3.3
When c 1 = c 2 = c, we have .
The first-order derivative ofδ t h (x) on x is
We then take the numerator of (−2x √ 1+x +2x −4)+
Similarly we can obtain lim x →∞ ∂δ th (x) ∂x < 0. 
